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The Consequences of Being Different – Statistical 





When information about the true abilities of job-seekers and applicants are hard to get, 
statistical discrimination by employers can be an efficient strategy in the hiring and wage 
setting process. But statistical discrimination can induce costs, if labor relations cannot be 
terminated in the short term and wages are fixed over a certain period. In this paper we use a 
unique longitudinal survey that follows the PISA 2000 students in their educational and work-
life career. We test whether deviance in the PISA test scores from what one would have 
predicted based on observable characteristics, influences the probability to succeed in the 
transition from compulsory school into a firm-based apprenticeship and whether it can explain 
differences of the individual performances during training. Our results suggest that hard-to-
get information plays a significant role in the transition, but not always in a symmetric 
manner. 
JEL-Code: I200, J240, J710. 








Swiss Federal Institute for Vocational 
Education and Training & 
University of Bern 
Switzerland 
barbara.mueller@ehb.schweiz.ch 
Stefan C. Wolter 







We would like to thank the Transitions from Education to Employment Survey (TREE) 
consortium for the kind permission to use the TREE data. The authors also thank participants 
of the economics of education area conference of the CESifo network and especially Joop 
Hartog, the discussant, for helpful comments and advice. 1. Introduction
Diﬃculties in identifying the true productive capacity of heterogeneous workers have played
an important role in labour economics for a long time. The literature predicts, that in the
absence of accurate information on ability, ﬁrms will base hiring or wage setting decisions
on easy-to-observe signals and thus screen and statistically discriminate on education level,
gender, ethnicity or other readily-available factors that are assumed to be correlated with
the lacking information (Phelps, 1972; Spence, 1973; Arrow, 1973; Aigner and Cain, 1977).
An indirect test of statistical discrimination is provided by the employer learning literature
(Farber and Gibbons, 1996; Altonji and Pierret, 1997, 2001), wherein information that is only
observable to the researcher, e.g. Armed Forces Qualiﬁcation Test-scores (AFQT), is found
to have increasing inﬂuence on wages with workers’ experience, indicating that workers’ true
productivity is gradually revealed over time by the labour market.
In this paper we attempt to investigate the eﬀect of easy-to-observe characteristics and hard-
to-observe ability on the success of applicants on the transition from compulsory schooling into
apprenticeship training, asking whether and to what extend ﬁrms use hard-to-get information
about the productive potential in their hiring decision (pre-market employer learning) and
whether hard-to-observe ability further unfolds its eﬀect within the apprenticeship training
period (employers learning).
Firm-based vocational training is the most common post-compulsory-schooling in Switzerland,
with more than two thirds of each cohort opting for this educational pathway. As an apprentice
needs to be hired by a ﬁrm for the training period, apprenticeship training entails early
integration into the labour market (about age 16). Employer’s screening devices thus play an
important role in the sorting process of youngsters into vocational education. In the public
discussion, stereotyping is claimed to play a (too) dominant role in this process. There are not
only claims that ﬁrms generally show insuﬃcient willingness to oﬀer apprenticeship places and
thus force a considerable part of compulsory-school graduates every year into non-certifying
scholastic interim solutions, but also are there signs that the process of allocation of young
applicants into vocational tracks might discriminate those with unfavourable attributes, as
for example those with low parental socio-economic status, migration background or low-level
compulsory school track attendance, presumably irrespective of their true ability.
There are at least two good reasons why subsequent training ﬁrms eﬀectively may base their
1hiring decisions on easily observable factors. First, many of individual background character-
istics are indeed correlated with true school performance and thus with labour productivity.
Second, ﬁrms are reluctant to rely solely on educational signals such as school marks and the
level of school track at compulsory school, because in the absence of uniform school stan-
dards and external exams in Switzerland, grades between schools and classes are not perfectly
comparable and therefore potentially poor predictors of the true ability of an applicant. It is
therefore only natural to assume that ﬁrms build expectations based on other easy-to-observe
ability proxies and decide accordingly.
However, although employment decisions solely based on easy-to-observe factors are cheap,
they may also be costly. Economic rationale therefore suggests a potentially high interest of
ﬁrms in seeking hard-to-get ability information before choosing apprenticeship applicants: In
contrast to ordinary work contracts, apprenticeship contracts cannot be terminated easily and
wages are ﬁxed over a deﬁned period of several years. Furthermore, as compulsory school
leavers at age 16 all are newcomers in the world of work, there is no advance information pro-
vided by the labour market on the applicant’s productive potential. So, in terms of allocative
eﬃciency as well as in terms of equity, the eﬀective achievement potential of a student rather
than his outward impression should act as a decisive determinant for his/her further career
prospects.
In order to test whether hard-to-observe students’ ability is revealed and accounted for within
the transition from schooling to market-based upper-secondary education, or whether, alter-
natively, allocation into vocational tracks is solely based on easy-to-observe factors, we make
use of the unique longitudinal data set TREE1 that comprises PISA-2000 test scores of pupils
at age 15 along with individual background characteristics and detailed information on their
further educational and working pathways ever since. The competence test of PISA provides
us with an ability measure that is only observable to the researcher, but not observed by
recruiters of training ﬁrms. Following the procedure in Farber and Gibbons (1996) we use the
test score information in its orthogonalised form, thus already cleaned from the part that is
explainable by observables, leaving the ability component that is hard-to-observe for outsiders.
1 As of 2008, TREE (Transitions from Education to Employment) is co-funded by the Swiss National Science
Foundation (SNSF) and the University of Basel. From 2000 to 2007, the project has been ﬁnanced and/or
carried out by said SNSF, the Departments of Education of the three cantons Berne, Geneva and Ticino,
the Federal Oﬃce for Professional Education and Technology (OPET), and the Swiss Federal Statistical
Oﬃce (FSO).
2We then go one step further and explicitly diﬀerentiate between so called overachievers and
underachievers. This enables us to test whether hard-to-observe ability is revealed (if at all)
symmetrically. Thereby we can test separately, whether or not ability information is gathered
in favour of those students who appear to be less able than they actually are (overachievers)
and, whether or not ability is revealed to the disfavour of those students who create an overall
outward impression that is better than their actual performance (underachievers).
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows: the next section describes the institu-
tional setting wherein the transition from lower- to upper-secondary education takes place
in Switzerland. Section 3 provides an overview of the literature that deals with statistical
discrimination, screening, stereotyping and employer learning. In section 4 we formulate the
hypotheses. The empirical strategy is described in section 5. Section 6 presents the data along
with descriptive information. The empirical results are discussed in section 7. Finally, section
8 concludes with a summary and discussion of our ﬁndings.
2. The Swiss education system and the transition into upper
secondary levels
2.1. The Swiss education system
Compulsory school in Switzerland comprises 9 school years: 6 years of primary school and
3 years of lower secondary school. There is variation between cantons with respect to the
design of schooling models: normally, there is sorting at lower secondary level into diﬀerent
school tracks according to pupils’ intellectual ability, based on teachers’ recommendations and
parental decisions. In the majority of cantons there are three levels: the most intellectually
demanding are upper-level school tracks which enable direct entry into Baccalaureate School,
then intermediate level tracks, and ﬁnally tracks oﬀering basic-level courses. There is consider-
able variation in the quantitative importance of these diﬀerent school tracks between cantons
and regions, implying that the respective ability thresholds vary, too.
After 9 years of compulsory schooling pupils can choose between several general and vocational
education alternatives at upper-secondary level. The majority of a cohort typically follows
3a vocational track in the form of apprenticeship training that lasts 3 to 4 years, depending
on the training occupation. Apprentices do most likely but not exclusively come from the
intermediate- and basic-level compulsory school track. Apprenticeship training consists of
ﬁrm-based on-the-job training (3-4 days a week) in combination with formal education in
public vocational schools (1-2 days) and is thus also called "dual" apprenticeship training. It
leads to a nationally recognised certiﬁcate.
Apart from ﬁrm-based vocational education there is also the possibility to acquire equiva-
lent certiﬁcates in full-time vocational schools. This option is, however, restricted to certain
occupational ﬁelds and is more present in Latin Switzerland (French and Italian speaking
part).
According to the yearly statistic that counts all entrances into diﬀerent educational tracks
at the post-compulsory level (FSO, 2000), the share of enrolments into vocational tracks
amounted to 73.5% of all certifying educations at upper-secondary level in the year 2001, with
only a minor part of 11% full-time vocational school entries of all vocational tracks; the rest
being ﬁrm-based.
Besides vocational education programmes there are diﬀerent general educational tracks lead-
ing to certiﬁcates at the upper-secondary level. The share of students that pursue a general
education path amounts to 26.5%. About 80% among them are typically enrolled in bac-
calaureate school programmes, which last 3 to 4 years and provide direct access to academic
universities. Baccalaureate programmes are open for those pupils who had either followed
an upper-level school track at the lower secondary level or who had followed a medium-level
school track and performed well enough to fulﬁl the academic conditions of admission.
2.2. The transition into apprenticeship training
As noted above, about two thirds of each cohort of compulsory school graduates opt for a
dual apprenticeship programme at upper-secondary level. Apprenticeship training requires
hiring by an employer willing to train the school leaver (combined training and work contract)
and can thus be seen as a regular labour market entry. The searching and selection process
for apprenticeship places is comparable to an ordinary job search procedure: ﬁrms announce
apprenticeship openings, potential apprentices apply for these openings, applicants undergo
a selection process with interviews and tests and, ﬁnally, either get the apprenticeship or
4have to continue searching. The latter might be accompanied by a process of adaption of
expectations about the aspiration level of apprenticeship track one might be suited for: af-
ter unavailingly applying for high-prestigious apprenticeships, applicants might adjust their
aspirations downward and begin to apply for less demanding vocational tracks.
Besides business cycle eﬀects that generally tend to aﬀect the yearly amount of apprenticeships
in a pro-cyclical way (Brunello, 2009; Muehlemann et al., 2009), the apprenticeship system
in Switzerland has proved to be considerably stable over the past decades, succeeding in
integrating a vast majority of pupils into post-compulsory education, and later on into the
labour market.
However, may be due to ongoing technological change and a shift towards a larger service
industry which leads to increased requirements on workers’ qualiﬁcations, educational pre-
requisites and social competences, the immediate transition from compulsory schooling to
vocational education is observed to be less smooth nowadays. The share of a cohort found
in non-certifying intermediate school years has increased from 9% to 14% since 1990, with a
disproportionately high amount of females among them (FSO, 2007).
There is some concern that ﬁnding an apprenticeship place is getting more and more diﬃcult,
especially for compulsory school leavers with unfavourable characteristics as for example low-
level compulsory school track attendance, bad school marks, migration background, low socio-
economic parental status or diﬃcult family situations. As many of these factors are known
to be correlated with the academic potential of individuals, it raises the question whether the
resulting allocation of young compulsory school graduates into vocational education is solely
explainable by easy-to-observe characteristics, or whether hard-to-observe ability aﬀects the
transition success of applicants, too.
53. Related Literature
Recruiters of ﬁrms only have limited information about the true skills of an applicant. They
might try to obtain better information by using screening tests, interviews and other measures,
but they all come at a cost. If the costs are high, the concept of statistical discrimination
predicts that ﬁrms base their hiring decisions on all easy-to-observe indicators that are assumed
to be correlated with the missing information (Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973; Aigner and Cain,
1977). Examples for inexpensive to observe characteristics are educational credentials, gender,
ethnicity, age or school reputation.
Empirically, statistical discrimination is diﬃcult to test, as a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of e.g. the
ethnicity or gender variable could also reﬂect taste based discrimination as it was formulated in
Becker (1957). However, an indirect empirical test of statistical discrimination is provided by
the employer learning literature. Examples are e.g. Farber and Gibbons (1996), who ﬁnd that
the part of AFQ test score information that was not predictable by statistical discrimination at
market entry (residualized test score) becomes increasingly correlated with wages as market
experience increases. Or Altonji and Pierret (1997, 2001), who simultaneously investigate
employer learning and statistical discrimination and ﬁnd that wages not only become more
dependent on a worker’s ability (AFQ tests), but at the same time also become less dependent
on easily observable characteristics. These results suggest that ﬁrms initially form believes
about the productivity of a worker by statistical discrimination e.g. on educational credentials
and ethnicity, and then, as the true individual productivity is revealed over time, revise believes
accordingly.2
The focus of all these studies is on symmetric employer learning, that is, all ﬁrms in the mar-
ket are assumed to learn simultaneously. If current employers, however, get better informed
about the productivity of their workers (asymmetric learning) then monopsony power of the
incumbent ﬁrms will aﬀect employees’ mobility behaviour and wages (Greenwald, 1986; Gib-
bons and Katz, 1991). The information asymmetry on workers’ ability is also proposed in the
literature as a possible source, amongst others, for ﬁrm investments in general human capital
and thus, under certain conditions, for the existence of vast apprenticeship systems (Acemoglu
and Pischke, 1998).
2 Evidence for employer learning has also been found for Great Britain (Galindo-Rueda, 2003) and, in the
case of blue-collar workers, for Germany (Bauer and Haisken-DeNew, 2001).
64. Hypotheses
Unlike the case discussed in employer learning’s literature which focuses on employees’ un-
observable characteristics that reveal themselves gradually, and the literature which discusses
the (asymmetric) learning potential on ability as a rational for ﬁrms’ training investments, we
start our analysis by asking whether or not potential employers (successfully) try to get costly
information on an trainee’s ability even before employing. There are at least two arguments
why one would expect training ﬁrms to invest considerably into learning about an applicant’s
productive potential prior to hiring the apprentice: First, the sorting process of young school
leavers into ﬁrms and occupations is not based on trial and error (job shopping) as for example
in the US (see Topel and Ward, 1992) as training contracts have a ﬁxed duration of 3 to 4
years and cannot be terminated as easily as ordinary working contracts. There is little scope
for adjustments in terms of training content below a deﬁned level, nor is it possible to down-
ward adjust the training wages that are ﬁxed beforehand for the entire period in the training
contract. Second, some apprenticeship training occupations are associated with considerable
ﬁrm net-investments (Muehlemann et al., 2007; Wolter and Ryan, 2010). Dropouts, e.g. due
to a bad match between trainee and the intellectual aspiration level of the apprenticeship track
can thus lead to considerable losses for the ﬁrm.
Hence, ﬁrms might avoid taking a large amount of uncertainty about a trainee’s true ability
and try do diminish the risk by investing in learning about the true ability before hiring.
In fact, it is observed that ﬁrms not only do extensive screening on the basis of application
letters, school-reports and interviews, but also use own screening-tests similar to PISA-tests or
oﬀer trial days ("Schnupperlehren"), where the applicants motivation and working behaviour
is observed.
Nevertheless, the outcome of the selection process is, in public and academic discussion, re-
garded as all or partly depending on some sort of stereotyping, such that for example females,
immigrants or low-level compulsory school track graduates are at a disadvantage, regardless
of their individual performance potential.
Using PISA-literacy test scores at age 15 as ability information that is only observable to the
econometrician, but not to the market, we want to test whether ability which lies above or
below the competence level one would predict based on easy-to-observe characteristics has an
inﬂuence on ﬁrms’ hiring decision and, additionally, whether it gets further revealed in the
7subsequent training period.
The analysis will be performed on four dependent variables: First, we want to test whether
the probability of ﬁnding an apprenticeship place directly after compulsory schooling only
depends on easy-to-get information, which would indicate hiring decisions purely based on
statistical discrimination. Second, we want to test whether hard-to-observe ability aﬀects the
resulting allocation of youngsters into diﬀerent vocational tracks that vary with respect to the
intellectual aspiration level, or whether, again, the success to get a more demanding appren-
ticeship place solely depends on easy-to-observe characteristics (see Bertschy et al., 2009, for
the importance of the aspiration level of the vocational track in the apprenticeship-to-work
transition). We then ask whether there is further revealing of hard-to-observe ability during
the apprenticeship period. We analyse whether the occurrence of problems during training
(failure in the ﬁnal exam, repetition, changes in training occupation or drop out) is related
to the part of ability that initially was hard-to-observe for the employer, assuming that, in
the case of problematic situations, the employer-employee relationship (apprenticeship con-
tract) might not have been realised if employers had possessed perfect information beforehand.
Finally, we look whether hard-to-observe ability is also reﬂected in the grades of the appren-
ticeship ﬁnal examination so that it translates into easy-to-observe information to the labour
market.
It is separately tested in each estimation whether hard-to-observe ability components are re-
vealed in an asymmetric manner. That is, we want to allow for the possibility that ﬁrms, when
evaluating the productive potential of an applicant, treat applicants diﬀerently, depending on
whether someone is above the ability level one would predict based on observables and vice
versa.
5. Empirical Strategy
Transition and apprenticeship success as just explained is represented by four diﬀerent depen-
dent variables. First, a dummy variable which indicates whether or not an applicant succeeds
8in seamlessly entering a certifying ﬁrm-based apprenticeship training.3 Second, a variable
for the intellectual standard of the vocational programme the successful applicants follow.
Third, a variable that reﬂects the occurrence of problems during training, and ﬁnally, a metric
variable that represents the grade in the apprenticeship ﬁnal examination. The exemplary
econometric setting thus looks as follows:
Successful Transition
i = y
i = i + Xi + B









where the vector X stands for students’ characteristics that are easily observable at the market
and that might be correlated with ability, and B
i represents the part of students’ ability which
is unobservable at ﬁrst glance.
To test whether hard-to-observe ability inﬂuences the transition and training success, we need
an ability measure B
i that is known to the econometrician and that is correlated with pupils’
"true" ability, but at the same time, cannot be easily observed by recruiters of training ﬁrms.
If B
i is correlated with true ability, then its estimated eﬀect ^  should signiﬁcantly diﬀer from
Zero if hard-to-observe ability is somehow revealed in the transition process into apprenticeship
training. If, however, decisions are only made based on observables, the coeﬃcient ^  should
not be signiﬁcant.
A variable that provides us with the possibility to diﬀerentiate between observable and unob-
servable ability is given in our data by a PISA literacy test score. PISA test scores are only
observable to researchers, but unknown to teachers, parents, employers, pupils, or any other
person or institution. This enables us to create a variable that represents the unobservable
3 There might be some youngsters who, after unsuccessfully applying for a ﬁrm-based apprenticeship, have
started some other kind of upper-secondary certifying education, e.g. in fulltime vocational school pro-
grammes. These cases are not part of our sample. Furthermore, pupils who stated they want to end up as
a nursing professional at the time of the PISA survey (female by the majority) are excluded from the anal-
ysis, because, at the time of PISA 2000, the corresponding vocational track for nurses couldn’t be started
before age 18, which naturally forced the youngsters in interim solutions, internships and non-certifying
preparatory courses for at least 2 years.
9part of a student’s ability, namely the part that is orthogonal to employers’ ready-at-hand
information. Following the procedure of Farber and Gibbons (1996) we deﬁne B
i to be the
residual from a regression of Bi on all observable students’ characteristics X that might act
as ability predicting factors. We ﬁrst regress test scores on the type of school track, school
grades and individual background variables such as immigration background, gender, parental
education, and other information that is known or assumed to be correlated with school per-
formance and observable to outsiders, either because it is enclosed in school reports or it is
common information in letters of application. The unobservable ability part B
i can then be
obtained by subtracting expected ability (predicted test scores) from observed test scores.
B
i = Bi   E(BijXi) = Bi   Xi^  (3)
The corresponding OLS regression accounts for about 45 percent of the variance in PISA test
scores (see model 1c in table 3), showing that many relevant determinants are represented by
characteristics that are observable by the market.
We then go one step further and use the residuals B
i to create two dummy variables: the ﬁrst
one indicates whether a student belongs to the group of underachievers, that is, if actual ability
Bi lies to a considerable amount t below the ability level E(BijXi) predicted by observable
characteristics (negative B
i that exceeds a certain threshold), the second one indicates whether
someone belongs to the group of overachievers, that is, if actual ability lies to a considerable
amount t above the level predicted by observable characteristics (positive B
i that exceeds a
certain threshold). These dummy variables allow us to test whether hard-to-observe ability is














i > 0 + t
0 otherwise
(5)
10We choose the threshold t to be a value that has some established implication; t equates
to the number of score points that lie within the same PISA proﬁciency level according to
OECD (2001) and thus comprises a span of 73 test score points. Therefore, under- and
overachievers are deﬁned to be those students whose realised PISA score diﬀers by more than
one proﬁciency level from what would have been expected according to his/her observable
characteristics. Note that the term "-achiever" always refers to the PISA-achievement relative
to the expectations throughout the paper.
6. Data and Descriptive Statistics
As a data base we use the Swiss longitudinal data set Transition from Education into Em-
ployment (TREE) that follows the respondents of the Programme for International Student
Assessment 2000 (PISA 2000) in their ﬁrst years after PISA 2000. The TREE survey is based
on the national sample of PISA and thus comprises all respondents who were in ninth-grade in
year 2000 and therefore in their last year of compulsory schooling4. This matched longitudinal
data set enables us to observe PISA test scores and individual background characteristics of
compulsory school leavers along with detailed information on their further educational and
working pathways.
The focus of PISA 2000 was on testing the reading literacy of 15-year-olds in 43 participating
countries (OECD, 2001), with mathematical and scientiﬁc literacy being investigated inciden-
tally. The average reading literacy test score of Swiss pupils turned out to not signiﬁcantly
deviate from the OECD mean (OECD, 2001), however, there was a comparatively large overall
variation in student performance found for Switzerland, combined with a rather strong social
selectivity. On a systemic level, this fact seems to be statistically explainable by the high
share of (foreign-language) migrants along with an early tracking policy at compulsory school
in Switzerland (FSO, 2003).
For the scope of our analysis we do not exploit the rich information of the entire TREE data set.
4 The Swiss national sample of ninth-graders was added to the PISA study for comparisons between the coun-
try’s diﬀerent language regions, as the international PISA survey only covers pupils at age 15, independent
of the grade they are in. Because many 15-year-olds are already in the 9th grade, the two populations
overlap.
11We restrict the sample to those compulsory school graduates who are on the apprenticeship
market the year after the PISA test, distinguishing between the successful ones, namely those
who follow a ﬁrm-based apprenticeship training after compulsory school, and the unsuccessful
ones, those who ﬁnd themselves in some kind of non-certifying interim solution or gap year,
albeit they have applied at least once for an apprenticeship place in a ﬁrm. This leaves us
with 2128 pupils that are observed in PISA as well as one year later. The other outcome
variables refer to the sample of those who successfully entered apprenticeship training. As
independent variables we only use. besides PISA reading literacy test score results, information
on pupils’ characteristics that are observable to the labour market and thus might be used
by recruiting ﬁrms to build expectations about an applicant’s ability. Apart from educational
credentials, like the type of compulsory school track and school marks, also family background
characteristics are expected to play a crucial role in this process, as ability might not be entirely
reproduced in school performance indicators.
The school track at lower secondary level is represented by a variable with four categories:
high-level school track that prepares for high school, intermediate level school track, basic-level
school track (without any requirements) and school track with no selection. The share of
pupils in diﬀerent tracks varies between cantons; we thus account for regional variations in
educational systems by controlling for cantons in all estimations. Further information on the
academic performance of a student is given by school marks in annual school reports. These
reports are important components of applications for apprenticeships places. The PISA data
provides us with information on school marks in the regional (test-) language, mathematics
and sciences. All the rest of the used variables provide easy-to-observe information on pupils’
individual background. There is information on gender, student’s age (as some of the ninth-
graders are one year older due to repetitions of school years) and migration status. The
latter is represented by two dummy variables, one for second generation immigrants (born
in Switzerland, but with both parents born outside Switzerland) and one for ﬁrst generation
immigrants (students born outside Switzerland). Furthermore, we include information on
highest achieved parental education (no post-compulsory education, upper secondary level,
tertiary level) and family structure (nuclear, single, mixed, other). For a complete variable
description see deﬁnitions in table 1 in Appendix A; for descriptive statistics and bivariate
relations to PISA test scores see table 2.
12In our study, the PISA reading literacy test score is assumed to meet three important re-
quirements: ﬁrst, to be observable only to researchers, but not to the market, second, to be
correlated with "true" ability and third, to be an objective measure and thus comparable
across individuals. Reading literacy is deﬁned in PISA as the ability to "understand, use
and reﬂect on written texts in order to achieve one’s goals, to develop one’s knowledge and
potential, and to participate eﬀectively in society" (OECD, 2001, p. 21). It goes far beyond
of what is typically tested in schools and is thus expected to have an eﬀect on e.g. labour
market success independent of educational attainment.
Initially, the PISA scaling procedure is tuned such that the a posteriori distribution of student
competences, with equal weight given to all OECD countries, has mean 500 and standard
deviation 100. In our ﬁnal sample, the average score is 481 (standard deviation 84) ranging
from 198 to 813 points.
As discussed in Section 5 we use PISA test scores to create a variable that represents the
unobservable part of student’s ability, that is, we want to ﬁlter out the ability information
that is not predictable by observable individual or group characteristics. The results of the
corresponding OLS-Regression are presented in table 3 in Appendix B (model 1c).
Figure 1 in Appendix B shows the distribution of the residuals resulting from regressing test
scores on students attributes. For 78% of the pupils the regression model is able to predict
PISA test scores within the range of one competence level (73 points). 11% of the observations
at each end of the residual distribution are identiﬁed to be overachievers (positive deviation
larger than one proﬁciency level) or underachievers (negative deviation larger than one pro-
ﬁciency level). For all these observations, realised test scores of under- and overachievers lie
outside the 95% conﬁdence interval of the predicted value.
As for the dependent variables, we ﬁrst analyse the indicator whether or not somebody who
has applied for a training place succeeds in entering a certifying apprenticeship directly after
compulsory schooling. The share of compulsory school leavers not having an apprenticeship
place one year after the PISA test amounts to 28%. These unsuccessful applicants are either
enrolled in a non-certifying scholastic interim solution (61%), do an internship or take a gap
year e.g. as Au-Pairs (21%) or, ﬁnally, are not engaged in any kind of education (18%).
The second dependent variable entails information on the intellectual aspiration level of the
vocational track for those who have started apprenticeship training. The corresponding aspi-
13ration levels for vocational tracks had been rated by experts (vocational advisers) on a scale
ranging from 1 to 6.5
About 42% of all apprentices in our sample follow an apprenticeship track of high intellectual
aspiration level (5 or 6), e.g. towards a certiﬁcate as commercial employee, IT-technician,
electronic technician, draughtsman, chemist, or optician. About 29% do an apprenticeship of
low intellectual aspiration level (1 or 2), as for example hairdresser, gardener, baker, painter,
sales person, ﬂorist, cook, carpenter, or cosmetician. As shown in table 2 in Appendix A there
is a relationship in the data between reading literacy measured by PISA and the intellectual
aspiration level of the vocational track someone follows.
In order to test whether hard-to-observe ability further unfolds its eﬀects beyond the transition
success, we analyse an indicator that takes value 1 for evidence of problems during appren-
ticeship training, such as repetition of an apprenticeship year, change of training occupation,
failure in the ﬁnal exam or drop out of training. The share of apprentices who exhibit at least
one of those critical events amounts to 16.8% of those, who are observable in the data for the
standard duration of their training. Note that we lose some observations due to panel mortal-
ity. Finally, as a last measure of apprenticeship success we use the grade in the apprenticeship
ﬁnal examination6. Information on ﬁnal grades ranging from 4 to 6 is available in the sample
for those who successfully graduated from apprenticeship training. Failures in the ﬁnal exams
are, amongst others, indicated and analysed within the aforementioned dependent variable.
5 We have imputed missing information on the aspiration level of some tracks by a regression on training
duration and vocational schooling hours (lectures), two factors that strongly explain the aspiration level.
6 The exam consists of a practical as well as an academic part (general and occupation-speciﬁc subjects). The
ﬁnal grade is a weighted average of the marks across diﬀerent academic subjects (always ranging from 1 to
6) and the practical occupational performance rated by external experts. The latter plays a dominant role
insofar as an insuﬃcient mark in the practical exam (below 4) automatically leads to a failure in the overall
examination, such that there is no certiﬁcation and no eligibility for being recognised as skilled worker on
the labour market, irrespective of academic excellence.
147. Results
7.1. Probability of directly entering a certifying apprenticeship training
We start by describing the results obtained for the question how observable and hard-to-
observe characteristics inﬂuence the probability of successfully applying for ﬁrm-based ap-
prenticeship training.
In the ﬁrst probit model in table 4 in Appendix B we only include characteristics that are ex-
ternally observable and might be used by outsiders to build expectations on students’ ability.
The estimated marginal eﬀects show that educational signals play a crucial role: Applicants
coming from a medium-level compulsory school track have a 8.7 percentage points higher
probability of entering apprenticeship training than those from basic-level tracks; the proba-
bility of successfully applying at a ﬁrm is however highest for those from high-level compulsory
schools (by 18.5 percentage points). School marks are important, too, particularly marks in
mathematics. Having a mark of 5 (good) instead of 3 (insuﬃcient), increases the probability
of immediately starting an apprenticeship by almost 11 percentage points. In contrast, marks
in sciences and in the test language (regional language) seem to have no additional eﬀect.
As for the other variables: females, immigrants (ﬁrst and second generation) and those living in
single parent households or patchwork families are less likely to be in certifying apprenticeship
one year after PISA, all else equal. On the other hand, having parents with upper-secondary or
tertiary education does not signiﬁcantly increase the probability of having a smooth transition,
whereas the coeﬃcients go into the expected direction. Apart from the gender variable and
the age 16 dummy, all the coeﬃcients point into the same direction as the coeﬃcients in the
PISA test score regression in table 3), indicating that easy-to-observe individual characteristics
might indeed play the role of ability predictors in practice.
Model 2 additionally includes the literacy test score as it was measured in the PISA survey. It
shows no signiﬁcant eﬀect on successfully applying for apprenticeship training. The coeﬃcients
of the other variables thus are only slightly weakened.
In Model 3 we add the dummy variables of main interest, namely dummies for being either un-
derachiever or overachiever. Those dummies indicate whether somebody possesses unobserved
ability that lies to a considerable amount above/below the expected level predicted by observ-
ables. In contrast to Model 2, this allows us to test if hard-to-observe ability components are
15revealed in a nonlinear way. Since the literacy-information has already been orthogonalised,
there is hardly any reaction in the coeﬃcients of the other variables (compared to Model
1). The estimation results show that underachievers have a signiﬁcantly lower probability of
9.4 percentage points of entering certifying apprenticeship compared to someone outwardly
identical who performs in the PISA-test as expected. In contrast, an eﬀect for overachievers
cannot be found. We can thus state the following: two compulsory school graduates with
exactly the same individual characteristics with respect to objective school performance and
observable family background, have diﬀerent chances to successfully apply for apprenticeship
training - depending on their ability components that cannot easily be observed by outsiders.
However, this seems to hold only for the group of underachievers, whereas overachievers do
not beneﬁt from potentially being better performers than they are able to signal7.
As an additional step we split the sample by the level of the compulsory school track, taking
together basic-level and no-selection compulsory schooling on the on hand, and the tracks
with extended requirements (medium and high-level) on the other hand. The underlying
PISA-regressions are presented in table 3 (model 2b and 3b).
According to the results the negative eﬀect of being an underachiever is much more pronounced
for pupils coming from low-level compulsory school tracks than for higher-level tracks (model 6
and model 9): the probability of having a smooth transition is 21.2 percentage points lower for
underachievers of low-level compulsory schooling compared to otherwise identical pupils who
achieved as expected in PISA 2000, whereas underachievers coming from compulsory school
tracks with extended requirements have a (marginally signiﬁcant) lower probability of only
7.6 percentage points. This could be interpreted in the way that pre-market screening is more
severe for those whose educational signal (compulsory school type) is less favourable from
the beginning. Thus, school leavers who can produce evidence of already having successfully
passed a sorting process (tracking) at compulsory school might not be screened in a similar
thorough way than others. Interestingly, overachievers of neither school track are able to
7 One might argue that, during the hiring process, employers especially look out for noncognitive skills of
pupils, for instance their motivation, and that if PISA test scores are correlated with these other factors, our
estimations might reﬂect the importance of these noncognitive factors and not the cognitive abilities, which
are already covered by school marks or educational track. We cannot completely rule out such mechanism
as they are diﬃcult to test. However, including e.g. the PISA test variable "instrumental motivation" in
all our estimations does not alter our results. Although motivation shows signiﬁcant eﬀects on some of
the outcomes, the results regarding our variable describing the hard-to-observe ability component remain
unaﬀected, as there is no correlation between the two independent variables.
16realize proﬁts from being smarter than one would expect. Thus, real ability is only decisive
as long as it helps to minimize the ﬁrm’s downward risk.
As for the other variables, the sample split does not reveal additional ﬁndings: Being female,
immigrant (ﬁrst or second generation) or coming from non-nuclear families has large signiﬁcant
negative eﬀects on the transition success in both samples, marks in mathematics, however,
seem to be more important for those coming from higher compulsory school tracks.
7.2. Intellectual aspiration level of dual vocational track
This section describes the empirical results for the question how hard-to-observe ability com-
ponents inﬂuence the intellectual aspiration level of the apprenticeship track someone enters
and thus how it aﬀects the allocation process of sorting young people into diﬀerent training
occupations.
The models 1 to 3 of table 5 in Appendix B contain OLS-results, where the aspiration level
is a metric dependent variable ranging from 1 to 6. The coeﬃcients of the achiever dummies
in model 3 suggest that the part of ability that cannot be predicted by observables unfolds
its eﬀect rather symmetrically. PISA-underachievers are on average found in lower aspiration
levels, overachievers are found in higher aspiration levels, both compared to otherwise iden-
tical school leavers whose ability is well predicted by easy-to-observe characteristics. Both
coeﬃcients are highly signiﬁcant and more than a half aspiration level in magnitude.
Again, observable characteristics play a crucial role; the eﬀects do not disappear when includ-
ing PISA test scores in Model 2. The school track followed at compulsory school is again
a very decisive factor: those who come from medium-level compulsory schooling are on av-
erage found in occupations with a higher rating of 2 aspiration levels, those from high-level
compulsory tracks are on average in occupations with higher ratings of 3 levels compared to
those coming from low-level compulsory tracks. School marks in mathematics also have a
signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on the aspiration level. Having for example a mark of 6 (excellent)
instead of 3 (insuﬃcient) enables to choose a vocational pathway that is rated almost 1 level
higher, all else equal.
In the next models we attempt to allow for diﬀerent eﬀects at the lower and upper range
of aspiration levels. A probit model for the probability to enter a vocational track (training
occupation) at low intellectual aspiration level (1 or 2) shows signiﬁcant eﬀects in the expected
17directions for both hard-to-observe ability dummies (Model 6): there is a slightly signiﬁcant
positive eﬀect for PISA-underachievers of 7.9 percentage points and a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect
for PISA-overachievers of 13.2 percentage points. Besides, the most important determinants
for not being in one of the occupational tracks at low aspiration levels are again given by the
level of compulsory school track and school marks in mathematics.
The probit results of models 7 to 9 show marginal eﬀects for the probability of following a vo-
cational track at high aspiration level (5 or 6). According to model 9, hard-to-observe ability is
again symmetrically revealed in the sense that underachievers are signiﬁcantly less likely to be
found in tracks at a high aspiration level (by 20.1 percentage points) and PISA-overachievers
are more likely to follow a high-aspiration-level track than their identical peers who perform
as expected (by 13.9 percentage points). Thus, costly-to-observe ability components play an
important role in the allocation process of young people into diﬀerent training occupations in
all estimated models.
7.3. Problems in apprenticeship and grades in ﬁnal examination
So far we have found that hard-to-observe ability plays a signiﬁcant role in ﬁrms’ selection of
apprentices. The screening process shows to be accompanied by a sort of pre-market learning,
where particularly negative ability deviations from predicted group means are detected. It
does, however, not imply that ability in either direction is completely revealed in the recruiting
process and that learning after hiring does not lead to changes in the employer-employee
relationship at a later stage.
The longitudinal character of the data allows us to explore the further inﬂuence of initially
hard-to-observe ability components on outcomes that are related to apprenticeship success.
The results of model 3 in table 6 show that hard-to-observe ability signiﬁcantly aﬀects the
probability of facing problems during apprenticeship: PISA-underachievers have a 15 per-
centage points higher probability of either dropping out, repeating a year, changing training
occupation or failing the exam; PISA-overachievers have a 7 percentage points lower probabil-
ity of having any problems, both compared to outwardly identical youngsters who achieved in
the PISA-test as one would predict. PISA-test-scores and hard-to-observe ability components,
respectively, virtually are the only dependent variables that clearly explain the occurrence of
problems during apprenticeship training.
18Estimations on the grades in the ﬁnal apprenticeship examination show, again, a rather asym-
metric eﬀect: PISA-underachievers perform signiﬁcantly worse than others (model 6 of table
6), overachievers do not have signiﬁcantly better ﬁnal grades. In contrast to the occurrence
of problematic events during apprenticeship, the performance in the ﬁnal exam is also heavily
inﬂuenced by the school marks and the school type of compulsory school track. Individual
background such as sex and nationality has lost its signiﬁcance as compared to the probabil-
ity of ﬁnding an apprenticeship place. Easy-to-observe characteristics thus seem to become
less important as true ability increasingly reveals itself to the employer in the course of the
training.
8. Summary and conclusion
The scope of this paper was to analyse whether and to what extend employer learning about
hard-to-observe ability takes place at the very beginning of a worker’s career, namely within the
transition process from compulsory schooling to marked-based upper-secondary education in
Switzerland. In the light of the fact that apprenticeship contracts have standardised contents,
ﬁxed duration and leave little scope to adjust prearranged wage proﬁles over the training
period, our ﬁrst aim was to analyse whether employers successfully try to get further-reaching
information on an applicant’s ability before hiring rather than just relying on ready-at-hand
information and thus statistically discriminating on school marks, level of compulsory school
track, gender or family background characteristics. Second, we analysed whether hard-to-
observe ability gets further revealed in the course of the apprenticeship period and is thus
transmitted into observable training outcomes.
Along with variables that reﬂect easy to get information about an applicant, we use PISA 2000
test scores as an ability measure that is only observable to the researcher, but not observed
by recruiters of ﬁrms oﬀering training places. We test how deviance in the PISA test scores
from what one would predict based on observable characteristics inﬂuences the transition
and training success. Among those applicants who signiﬁcantly diﬀer from their predicted
group mean in PISA test scores, we technically distinguish between underachievers (negative
19deviation, meaning they are less able than one would predict) and overachievers (positive
deviation, meaning that they are smarter than one would expect).
Our results suggest that this kind of hard-to-observe ability plays a signiﬁcant role for the
transition as well as the training success, but not always in a symmetric manner.
Regarding applicants’ transition success we ﬁnd that only PISA-underachievers are aﬀected
by pre-market employer learning. They are less likely to successfully apply for apprenticeship
places than their otherwise identical peers. The negative eﬀect is largest for those under-
achievers who cannot produce evidence of already having successfully passed a sorting process
at compulsory schooling (tracking). Overachievers, in turn, do not seem to beneﬁt from hav-
ing more academic potential than they are able to demonstrate. Therefore, costly-to-observe
ability components are only revealed at the lower end of the residual distribution, indicating
that ﬁrms invest in pre-market learning particularly in order to minimize the downward risk of
a mismatch. Interviews, own screening-tests (so called multi-checks or basic-checks) and trial
days are widespread channels through which hard-to-get ability information might reach the
employers. We cannot exclude the possibility that hiring decisions are also based on statistical
discrimination, as many of the individual attributes as sex, nationality and family background
as well as educational credentials show still signiﬁcant eﬀects after controlling for PISA test
scores.
As for the resulting allocation of successful applicants into diﬀerent intellectually demanding
vocational tracks we ﬁnd, however, rather symmetric hard-to-observe ability eﬀects: PISA-
underachievers are found in less intellectually demanding professions than their otherwise
identical peers, overachievers are sorted into more demanding apprenticeships than otherwise
comparable applicants. Hard-to-get ability information is thus revealed in a way that it
signiﬁcantly increases allocative eﬃciency at both ends of the distribution.
Summarised, hard-to-observe ability already (partially) unfolds its eﬀects within the transition
process into apprenticeship training.
The results regarding long-term outcomes suggest, however, that there is still additional reveal-
ing of ability during the subsequent training period. Apprentices who were PISA-overachievers
are less likely to face problems such as drop outs, repetition, changing vocational track or ﬁ-
nal exam failure. In turn, PISA-underachievers, who despite their lower than expected ability
successfully found an apprenticeship, are disproportionally more likely to be exposed to these
20problematic events. Additionally, PISA-underachievers have lower ﬁnal grades than their oth-
erwise identical peers, whereas there is no signiﬁcant positive eﬀect for PISA-overachievers.
The fact that underachievers who successfully found an apprenticeship show inferior outcomes
during the apprenticeship period provides an additional explanation why ﬁrms seem to place
more emphasis on detecting under- rather than overachievers in the course of the hiring pro-
cess.
We can show in this paper that in the case of costly and far-ranging hiring decisions, such as
apprenticeship training contracts, information that cannot be observed easily is already used
by employers at the initial stage of the hiring process and that applicants that diﬀer from their
apparently similar peers in regard of their true ability are in consequence treated diﬀerently.
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23A. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1: Variable Deﬁnition
Variable Deﬁnition
Certifying education Dependent variable. Equals 1 if pupil enters a certifying upper-sec. edu-
cation in form of apprenticeship training directly after compulsory school,
0 otherwise (non-certifying interim solutions or no education).
Aspiration level Dependent variable. Aspiration level of 105 vocational tracks (expert rat-
ings) from 1 (low) to 6 (high). Used in metric form as well as in form
of 2 dummy variables: low aspiration level equals 1 if rating is 1 or 2, 0
otherwise; high aspiration level equals 1 if rating is 5 or 6, 0 otherwise.
Problems in training Dependent variable. Equals 1 if apprentice exhibits repetition of appren-
ticeship year, failure in exam, change in training occupation or drop out.
Grade of ﬁnal exam Dependent variable. The average grade of the ﬁnal apprenticeship exam-
ination. Metric scale 4 - 6 (4 = suﬃcient, 6 = excellent).
PISA test score Reading literacy test score from the PISA 2000 survey.
Underachiever Equals 1 if PISA test score is considerably (1 competence level) lower than
predicted by observables, 0 otherwise.
Overachiever Equals 1 if PISA test score is considerably (1 competence level) higher
than predicted by observables, 0 otherwise.
Female Equals 1 if female, 0 if male.
Nationality Dummies representing 3 categories: Swiss (born in Switzerland with at
least one parent born in Switzerland), "second generation immigrant"
(pupil born in Switzerland but parents born outside Switzerland), "ﬁrst
generation immigrant" (pupil and parents foreign born).
Age 16 at PISA survey Equals 1 if pupil was age 16 at the time of PISA 2000, 0 if age 15.
Parental education Dummies representing 3 categories of highest parental education: compul-
sory school, upper-sec. education, tertiary education.
Family structure Dummies representing 4 categories: nuclear, single, mixed and other,
where the last category also covers missing information.
Mark in test language Mark in test language (German, French, Italian, depending on linguistic
region) in last school report. Metric scale 1-6 (1=lowest, 6=highest).
Mark in mathematics Mark in mathematics in last school report (1=lowest, 6=highest).
Mark in sciences Mark in sciences (mean across biology, chemistry, physics, sciences) in last
school report. Metric scale 1-6 (1=lowest, 6=highest).
Level compulsory school Dummies for the school track that was attended at the time of the PISA
2000 survey: low-level compulsory school (e.g. Realschule), medium-level
compulsory school (e.g. Sekundarschule), high-level compulsory school
(e.g. Pro-Gymnasium) and "no selection" (integrated track, mixed).
Regions (cantons) Dummies for 22 Swiss cantons (= states).
24Table 2: Descriptives - univariate and bivariate (with PISA Test Scores)
Continuoues variables (N=2128) Mean Std.Dev. Min Max corr PISA
PISA Literacy test score 480:55 83:93 198:04 812:88 1:00
Mark in test language 4:77 0:65 1:00 6:00 0:24
Mark in mathematics 4:76 0:79 1:00 6:00 0:07
Mark in science 4:95 0:66 1:00 6:00 0:18
Grade of apprenticeship 4:81 0:30 4:00 5:90 0:20
ﬁnal examination (N=1125)
Distribution of PISA Test Scores*
Categorial variables (N=2128) Share (%) Mean* Std.Dev.* Min* Max*
Achieves-as-expected 77:8 480:9 69:2 286:5 643:9
Underachiever 10:9 371:0 61:3 198:0 502:4
Overachiever 11:3 583:4 60:2 444:0 812:9
Male 56:6 475:8 85:1 198:0 737:5
Female 43:4 486:8 82:0 250:6 812:9
Swiss 79:9 494:9 78:5 198:0 812:9
Immigrant: second generation 9:4 439:4 82:5 283:6 622:5
Immigrant: ﬁrst generation 10:7 410:0 76:8 250:6 634:6
Age 15 65:5 492:2 83:1 198:0 812:9
Age 16 34:5 458:4 81:0 255:0 704:3
Parental education: comp. school 35:3 455:6 83:0 198:0 738:7
Parental education: sec. II 34:3 494:8 83:2 257:7 812:9
Parental education: tertiary 30:4 493:4 79:2 268:1 737:5
Family structure: nuclear 76:6 485:6 83:1 198:0 738:7
Family structure: single 12:4 469:5 76:5 267:1 697:3
Family structure: mixed 6:7 469:0 86:7 257:7 812:9
Family structure: other 4:3 440:0 98:7 255:0 670:5
Track lower sec II: no selection 2:0 457:7 88:3 272:0 676:1
Track lower sec II: low 35:9 421:6 73:5 198:0 653:8
Track lower sec II: medium 47:1 509:6 69:2 294:9 812:9
Track lower sec II: high 14:9 534:1 63:8 357:3 738:7
Educational status one year after PISA (N=2128)
Certifying apprenticeship training 71:7 488:5 81:3 198:0 737:5
Non-certifying/no education 28:3 460:5 87:3 255:0 812:9
Aspiration level of apprenticeship track (N=1599)
very low (1) 14:3 442:2 76:9 198:0 640:9
low (2) 14:4 449:5 83:8 278:5 737:4
lower medium (3) 13:9 473:6 71:3 268:8 671:7
upper medium (4) 15:8 474:2 77:5 268:1 670:5
high (5) 8:4 530:3 62:9 323:9 668:7
very high (6) 33:3 527:7 67:9 300:8 737:5
Problems in training (N=1397)
Any problems (1) 16:8 458:2 74:6 298:3 670:5
No problems (0) 83:1 494:6 81:2 198:0 737:5
25B. Figures and Tables
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Note: The unexplained part of PISA test scores is computed by subtracting
predicted test scores (OLS-regression on all observables) from realised test scores
(see section 5 and Model 1c of table 3).


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29Table 6: Estimation results: Problems in apprenticeship and grades in ﬁnal examination
Probit: Problems OLS: Final grade in
in apprenticeship apprenticeship exam
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)






Female  0:028  0:023  0:025  0:024  0:029  0:025
(0:028) (0:028) (0:028) (0:024) (0:024) (0:024)
Immigrant: second generation 0:065 0:035 0:065  0:034  0:021  0:039
(0:046) (0:046) (0:044) (0:045) (0:047) (0:045)
Immigrant: ﬁrst generation 0:058 0:033 0:056  0:039  0:023  0:034
(0:049) (0:050) (0:049) (0:043) (0:045) (0:044)
Age 16 0:070 0:051+ 0:070  0:022  0:009  0:023
(0:031) (0:029) (0:029) (0:025) (0:025) (0:025)
Parental education: upper sec.  0:048  0:040  0:039 0:017 0:013 0:016
(0:033) (0:032) (0:032) (0:026) (0:026) (0:027)
Parental education: tertiary  0:003  0:004  0:007  0:013  0:018  0:012
(0:035) (0:034) (0:034) (0:027) (0:027) (0:027)
Family structure: single 0:068+ 0:072+ 0:076+  0:063+  0:071  0:066+
(0:040) (0:040) (0:040) (0:036) (0:036) (0:036)
Family structure: mixed 0:024 0:032 0:048  0:114  0:109  0:121
(0:046) (0:043) (0:044) (0:054) (0:053) (0:054)
Family structure: other 0:125 0:119 0:140+  0:047  0:041  0:049
(0:077) (0:073) (0:076) (0:053) (0:053) (0:053)
School mark in test language 0:011 0:031 0:018 0:051 0:039+ 0:048
(0:029) (0:025) (0:024) (0:023) (0:023) (0:023)
School mark in mathematics 0:008 0:009 0:007 0:043 0:041 0:042
(0:017) (0:017) (0:017) (0:015) (0:015) (0:015)
School mark in sciences  0:042+  0:035  0:044 0:049 0:044 0:050
(0:022) (0:022) (0:022) (0:019) (0:019) (0:019)
Track lower sec II: no selection 0:069 0:081 0:081  0:270+  0:279+  0:272+
(0:082) (0:084) (0:082) (0:154) (0:151) (0:154)
Track lower sec II: medium-level  0:006 0:042  0:025 0:115 0:072 0:116
(0:036) (0:039) (0:036) (0:032) (0:033) (0:032)
Track lower sec II: high-level  0:050 0:029  0:066 0:242 0:182 0:241
(0:050) (0:052) (0:050) (0:045) (0:047) (0:046)
Aspiration level 2  0:029  0:013  0:010 0:034 0:022 0:024
(0:057) (0:057) (0:057) (0:042) (0:042) (0:042)
Aspiration level 3 0:059 0:066 0:058 0:067 0:054 0:063
(0:052) (0:052) (0:052) (0:041) (0:040) (0:041)
Aspiration level 4 0:020 0:031 0:025  0:008  0:026  0:014
(0:051) (0:050) (0:049) (0:044) (0:043) (0:044)
Aspiration level 5 0:035 0:076 0:070  0:067  0:095  0:077+
(0:056) (0:057) (0:057) (0:043) (0:045) (0:044)
Aspiration level 6 0:024 0:057 0:054  0:144  0:167  0:154
(0:047) (0:048) (0:047) (0:036) (0:037) (0:037)
Problems in apprenticeship  0:026  0:017  0:018
(0:032) (0:033) (0:033)
Constant 4:088 3:932 4:110
(0:146) (0:153) (0:146)
N 1397 1397 1397 1125 1125 1125
R2/Pseudo-R2 0:1217 0:142 0:145 0:185 0:197 0:190
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, robust standard errors in parentheses. Average marginal eﬀects presented.
Ref. group: Achieves-as-expected, male, Swiss parents, age<16, highest parental education: comp. school,
nuclear family, low-level comp. school track. Cantons are controlled for (22 dummies) in all models.
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